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Preamble
	 The	notion	that	there	is	more	than	one	kind	of	intelligence	for	human	
beings,	and	that	social	and	emotional	intelligence	(EI)	is	just	as	critical	
as	cognitive	intelligence	for	success	in	the	world	is	by	now	fairly	well-
received	and	well-established	in	North	American	educational	contexts.	
The	main	proponents	of	social	and	EI	are	Goleman,	Boyatzis,	and	McKee	
(2002)	who	are	noted	for	advancing	the	notion	that	social	and	emotional	
intelligence	is	important	for	effective	leadership	in	any	organizations,	
including	teacher	education	and	teaching	in	schools.	Convinced	that	this	
notion	is	applicable	to	all	educational	contexts,	Goleman	with	others	
founded	the	Collaborative	for	Academic,	Social,	and	Emotional	Learning	
(CASEL)	in	1994	with	the	mission	“to	establish	social	and	emotional	
learning	as	an	essential	part	of	education”	(CASEL,	2009).1	His	work	
has been enormously influential in various education and leadership 
contexts,	ranging	from	business	leadership	education	to	classroom	man-
agement.	But	the	more	we—the	authors	of	this	article—are	impressed	
by the magnitude of salutary influence that the Goleman et al. (2002) 
EI	work	spreads	in	diverse	educational	domains,	the	more	we	see	its	
limitations	as	an	educational	project	that	can	actually	and	practically	
augment	people’s	EI	and	ethics.	
	 We	have	chosen	to	consider	EI	in	this	article	not	only	because	of	its	
far-reaching influence in the field of education as abovementioned but 
also	because	of	the	claim	that	it	was	inspired	by	Aristotle’s	virtue	ethics	
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(Goleman,	1995)	and	its	association	with	ethical	development.2	Our	own	
research	and	practice	interest	has	been	fostering	ethical	development	in	
people	via	virtue	ethics,	and	if	EI	is,	as	Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	claimed,	
such	a	singularly	 important	 ingredient,	we	would	 like	to	 investigate	
their	conceptualization	of	EI	and	consider	the	possibility	of	further	de-
veloping	and	fortifying	it.	Given	the	acceptance	of	EI,	its	claimed	value	
and	roots	in	virtue	ethics	has	prompted	us	to	research	the	limitations	
of	the	EI	work	by	Goleman	et	al.	(2002),	and	to	search	for	works	that	
would	address	these	limitations.3	The	Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	EI	project	
has	attracted	a	healthy	debate	regarding	its	philosophic	and	practical	
foundations.4	This	discussion	suggests	that	there	is	empirical	evidence	
that	EI	has	a	positive	impact	on	student’s	behaviour;	however,	we	believe	
instructive	philosophic	concerns	remain.	We	are	particularly	concerned	
about	 the	 educator’s	EI	 impacting	 students’	 learning	 and	 emotional	
intelligence, a concern also identified by others (Jennings & Greenberg, 
2009).	Our	paper	advances	the	thesis	that	the	cultivation	of	educators’	
EI requires the practice of virtue ethics. We establish this thesis by first 
examining	the	limitations	of	the	Golemanian	EI,	and	then	by	showing	
how	 these	 limitations	 can	be	addressed	by	MacIntyre’s	 (1984,	1988)	
virtue	ethics,	which	is	a	contemporary	version	of	Aristotelian	ethics.	In	
the	process,	we	also	address	what	we	see	as	MacIntyre’s	(1984,	1988)	
theoretical	limitations	that	are	in	the	way	of	extending	virtue	ethics	to	
become	the	cornerstone	of	school	teaching	and	learning.	We	also	bring	
in	Vokey’s	(2001)	work	to	support	our	thesis.	We	present	our	work	on	
the	marriage	of	EI	and	virtue	ethics	as	a	challenge	to	the	conventional	
and	hegemonic	conception	and	practice	of	education	that	marginalizes	
the	education	of	the	heart.5
Educators’ Emotions Are No Private Matter
	 Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	held	that	the	leader	acts	as	the	group’s	emo-
tional	 guide	 and	 “has	maximal	 power	 to	 sway	 everyone’s	 emotions”	
(Goleman,	et	al.,	2002,	p.	5).	The	emotions	of	the	leader	are	important	
because,	for	example,	if	people’s	emotions	are	pushed	toward	enthusi-
asm,	performance	can	soar.	He	refers	to	this	effect	as	resonance.	That	is,	
those under the influence and guidance of the leader/educator come into 
emotional	resonance	with	her	or	him:	“Whether	an	organization	fails	or	
flourishes depends to a remarkable extent on the leaders’ effectiveness 
in	 this	primal	emotional	dimension”	 (Goleman	et	al.,	2002,	p.	5).	To	
elaborate,	a	learning	organization’s	performance	depends	on	whether	
the	emotional	mood	is	positive	or	negative,	and	this	is	established	by	
the	 leader	whose	emotions	are	 contagious.	As	 this	 is	a	 crucial	point	
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in	the	Golemanian	thinking,	we	wish	to	elaborate	on	it	and	draw	out	
implications	for	the	cultivation	of	EI.	Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	hold	that	
emotions	spread	whenever	people	are	near	one	another,	even	when	the	
contact	is	nonverbal.	There	have	been	a	number	of	empirical	researches	
that	support	this	thesis.	For	example,	Friedman	states:	“[W]hen	three	
strangers	sit	facing	each	other	in	silence	for	a	minute	or	two,	the	one	
who	is	most	emotionally	expressive	transmits	his	or	her	mood	to	the	
other	two—without	speaking	a	single	word”	(as	cited	in	Goleman	et	al.,	
2002,	p.	7).	To	elaborate,	the	following	has	been	observed:	
People	seem	to	be	capable	of	mimicking	other	people’s	facial,	vocal,	and	
postural	expressions	with	stunning	rapidity.	As	a	consequence,	they	
are	able	to	feel	themselves	into	other	emotional	lives	to	a	surprising	
extent	 .	 .	 .	 Awareness	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 emotional	 contagion	may	
prove	useful	in	understanding	and	perhaps	advancing	various	areas	
of	interpersonal	communication	between	.	.	 .	teachers	and	students.	
(Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993, p. 99)
	 There	 is	 substantial	 evidence	 that	 people	 mimic	 speech,	 facial	
expressions,	mannerisms,	moods	and	emotions	of	others	(Chartrand,	
Maddux, & Lakin, 2005). As well, recent studies of the brain show that 
the	limbic	system,	which	determines	our	emotional	response,	is	an	open	
system	that	relies	on	external	sources	to	regulate	itself.	That	would	ex-
plain	why	people	rely	on	emotional	connections	to	other	people	for	their	
emotional stability (Goleman et al., 2002). According to Rosengren et 
al.	(as	cited	in	Goleman	et	al.,	2002),	“three	or	more	incidents	of	intense	
stress	within	a	year	triple	the	death	rate	in	socially	isolated	middle	aged	
men,	whereas	this	experience	has	no	impact	on	the	death	rate	of	men	
who	cultivate	many	close	relationships”	(p.	7).	Lewis	et	al.	(as	cited	in	
Goleman	et	al.,	2002)	suggest	that	the	limbic	system	is	open	to	signals	
transmitted	by	others	in	a	way	that	can	alter	hormone	levels,	cardio-
vascular	function,	sleep	rhythms,	and	immune	functions	of	others	(p.	
7). Friedman and Riggio (as cited in Goleman et al., 2002) observed that 
heart	rates	and	other	physiological	responses	of	two	people	synchronize	
after	a	15-minute	conversation.	This	synchronization	of	moods	can	occur	
even	when	there	is	no	conversation.	Goleman	et	al.	stated:	“[P]eople	in	
groups	inevitably	catch	feelings	from	one	another,	sharing	everything	
from	jealousy	to	envy	to	angst	or	euphoria”	(2002,	p.	7).	According	to	
Kelly	and	Barsade	(as	cited	in	Goleman	et	al.,	2002),	“the	more	cohe-
sive	the	group,	the	stronger	the	sharing	of	mood”	(p.7).	Furthermore,	
research	has	demonstrated	that	the	leader’s	moods	are	contagious:	that	
is,	they	are	transferred	to	subordinates	in	self-managing	groups,	and	
influence group processes that are critical to group effectiveness (Cote 
& Sy, 2005). These findings have a major implication for the education 
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of	leaders	in	any	arena	of	educational	leadership	capacities—including	
schoolteachers.	
	 Given	that	the	leader’s	personal	and	private	emotions	are	contagious,	
Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	draw	a	profound	conclusion.	He	holds	that	how	a	
leader	feels	is	not	a	private	matter:	It	has	public	consequences.	There-
fore,	“the	most	meaningful	act	of	responsibility	that	leaders	can	do	is	to	
regulate	their	own	state	of	mind”	(Goleman	et	al.,	2002,	p.	47)	and	“effec-
tive	leadership	demands	the	capacity	for	managing	one’s	own	turbulent	
feelings	while	allowing	the	full	expression	of	positive	emotions”(Goleman	
et	 al.,	 2002,	 pp.	 48).	 For	many	 students,	 negative	 emotions	 impede	
learning while positive emotions support learning (Schutz & Perkrun, 
2007).	The	terms	negative	and	positive	refer	to	individual	experiences.	
Goleman	et	al.	suggested	that	the	leader’s	(in	our	context,	educator’s)	
private emotions have a significant impact on the emotional experience 
of	those	who	work	with	her	or	him,	and	hence	on	learning	outcomes.	
This	suggests	that	leaders	have	the	responsibility	for	developing	their	
own	EI,	given	that	their	emotional	well-being	and	competency	affect	
people’s	learning	and	growth.	Now	we	come	back	to	the	crucial	ques-
tion:	how	do	we	increase	emotional	intelligence?	What	is	the	process	of	
education	for	this?	As	we	shall	show,	Golemanian	understanding	of	how	
to	educate	people	for	EI	has	some	fundamental	limitations.	Unless	we	
address	this,	we	cannot	move	forward	in	any	serious	way	with	our	goal	
of	educating	individuals	for	emotional	intelligence.	
Limitations of Goleman et al. EI as an Educational Project 
	 In	the	Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	conception,	EI	is	fundamentally	an	indi-
vidualistic	trait.	It	is	not	predicated	on	principles	espoused	in	MacIntyre’s	
(1984)	virtue	ethics	which	holds	that	the	emotions	of	individuals	must	
be	cultivated	in	the	context	of	a	communal	or	institutional	practice	that	
values	internal	goods,	such	as	justice,	courage,	and	honesty.	While	Gole-
man	et	al.	(2002)	saw	the	communal	implication	of	the	individual	leaders’	
emotional	states,	this	did	not	affect	his	conceptualization	of	the	cultivation	
of	EI	as	an	individual	rather	than	a	relational	and	communal	matter.	
	 Let	us	 further	explicate	and	elaborate	what	we	are	saying	here.	
When	a	human	quality	is	taken	as	an	individual	trait,	we	tend	to	see	it	
as	something	that	the	individual	possesses,	like	intelligence	or	beauty.	
Having reified such quality as an individual attribute, we proceed to 
increase	it	by	targeting	it	with	enhancing	techniques	and	resources	such	
as	how-to	instructions,	supplements,	tools,	exercises,	and	enrichments.	
The	same	seems	to	be	happening	with	increasing	EI.
	 Our	point	is	that	it	is	a	mistake	to	reify	human	qualities,	including	
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EI,	and	treat	 them	as	 individual	 traits.	Human	qualities	 in	 individu-
als	are	 invariably	and	 inextricably	 involved	 in	and	constructed	out	of	
long-term	 socialization	and	acculturation	 contexts	 and	processes	 that	
individuals participate (Holland, Skinner, Lachicotte, & Cain, 1998). 
What	this	means	in	terms	of	education	of	these	qualities	is	that	we	need	
to	talk	about	communal	and	institutional	practices	that	guide	and	shape	
the	individuals	who	participate	in	them.	This	understanding	is	missing	
in	the	work	of	Goleman	et	al.	(2002),	and	therein	lie	the	limitations	and	
weaknesses	of	their	work	on	EI.	We	are	interested	in	exploring	the	com-
munal	and	institutional	practices	that	foster	and	cultivate	EI.	To	us,	what	
such	cultivation	amounts	to	is	essentially	none	other	than	what	has	been	
traditionally	known	as	virtue	ethics.	Our	next	step,	then,	is	to	investigate	
virtue	ethics	to	see	how	it	will	help	with	the	cultivation	of	EI.	
MacIntyre’s Virtue Ethics 
	 We	will	now	sketch	out	MacIntyre’s	(1984)	virtue	ethics	and	how	it	
may	apply	to	our	society,	and	compare	this	virtue	ethics	to	Golemanian	
proposals	for	the	development	of	social	and	emotional	intelligence.	First	
a	 little	background	discussion	of	MacIntyre’s	 (1984)	ethics:	This	will	
help	us	see	the	matter	of	EI	as	an	ethical	task.	MacIntyre	(1984)	argued	
that	ethics	is	a	science	that	rests	on	a	threefold	scheme	that	assumes	
a	contrast	between	(a)	human	nature	as	it	is,	and	(b)	human	nature	as	
it	could	be	if	it	realized	its	purpose	or	telos.	The	third	element	is	(c)	the	
human	effort	to	move	from	the	former	to	the	latter,	which	constitutes	
ethics.	To	be	an	ethical	being	is	to	make	this	effort	in	the	face	of	con-
tinual human failure to fulfill telos. What helps and furthers this effort 
is	virtue:	the	human	agency	to	regulate	and	discipline	passions,	and	
organize	and	direct	will	towards	one’s	telos.	
A	virtue	is	an	acquired	human	quality	the	possession	and	exercise	of	
which	tends	to	enable	us	to	achieve	those	goods	which	are	internal	to	
practices	and	the	lack	of	which	effectively	prevents	us	from	achieving	
any	such	goods.	(MacIntyre,	1984,	p.	191)
It	is	through	the	exercise	of	virtues	that	“our	desires	and	emotions	are	
to	be	put	into	order,”	which	enables	one	to	move	from	the	former	state	
to	the	latter,	and	realize	“our	true	nature	and	to	reach	our	true	end”	
(MacIntyre,	1984,	p.	52).	To	acquire	the	virtues	requires	one	to	cultivate	
a	certain	asceticism	wherein	one	is	aware	of	one’s	initial	appetites,	pas-
sions,	and	emotions,	and	yet	is	able	to	hold	them	in	abeyance	for	the	
purpose of fulfilling one’s telos (MacIntyre, 1999). 
	 So	 far	we	have	articulated	MacIntyre’s	 (1984)	 three-fold	schema	
regarding	the	individual’s	development	of	virtue	ethics.	That	is,	the	in-
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quiry	concerning:	(1)	who	I	am	now;	(2)	what	I	could	be;	(3)	and	what	is	
the	practice	of	ethics	that	will	move	me	from	where	I	am	today	towards	
my	 ideal?	MacIntyre	 (1984)	held	 that	 this	process	occurs	within	 the	
context	of	practices	and	within	a	tradition.	For	example,	a	woman	who	
is	a	Buddhist,	a	doctor,	and	a	mother	is	involved	in	the	tradition	of	Bud-
dhism	and	two	practices:	medicine	and	motherhood.	Tradition	provides	
a	context	for	her	ethics	across	those	practices,	and	provides	her	with	an	
overarching	sense	of	the	good	that	helps	her	make	decisions	about	the	
priority	of	practices.	For	example,	ideally,	her	tradition	will	inform	her	
which	practice	should	take	priority	with	respect	to	the	amount	of	time	
she	should	dedicate	to	motherhood	versus	medicine.	Each	of	the	prac-
tices	also	provides	a	context,	history,	and	standards	of	excellence	within	
which	she	will	operate.	Her	values	and	ethic	are	expressed	in	her	daily	
work	with	people.	Does	she	have	compassion?	Is	she	trustworthy?	Does	
she have courage? Does she follow the codified ethics of her practice? 
And finally does she earn an income, and contributes to supporting her 
family	to	be	happy	and	healthy?	In	this	brief	description,	which	will	be	
elaborated	later,	it	can	be	seen	that	context,	community,	and	tradition	
are	critical	elements	providing	a	framework	for	the	development	and	
practice	of	the	virtues.	
	 Now,	note	the	similarity	between	the	Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	EI	in	
four	dimensions	(self-awareness,	etc.)	and	MacIntyre’s	(1984)	virtue	
ethics.	Where	the	two	depart	is	the	emphasis	Goleman	et	al.	placed	
on	the	work	of	the	individual	who	develops	largely	due	to	his	or	her	
own	effort	with	the	support	of	and	in	the	context	of	a	few	trusted	col-
leagues	(2002).	The	context	within	which	this	development	takes	place	
is not addressed by Goleman et al. (2002) to any significant extent. 
MacIntyre	 (1984),	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 held	 that	 tradition,	 and	 the	
context	where	one	contributes	to	society	that	he	refers	to	as	practices,	
are particularly important in defining and supporting the develop-
ment	of	virtues.	MacIntyre	(1984)	argued	that	western	philosophical	
thought has attempted to replace telos that had been first derived 
from the Greek concept of the good and later from Christian, Judaic, 
and	Muslim	theology,	with	reason	and	utility—both	of	which	failed	
to	adequately	replace	telos.	With	respect	to	reason,	MacIntyre	(1984)	
felt	that	it	cannot	provide	a	genuine	comprehension	of	human’s	true	
end	because	questions	of	ends	can	only	be	determined	through	values	
that	are	determined	subjectively—not	through	reason.	Elaborating,	
MacIntyre	(1984)	stated:
.	.	.	questions	of	ends	are	questions	of	values,	and	on	values	reason	is	
silent; conflict between rival values cannot be rationally settled. Instead 
one	must	simply	choose—between	parties,	classes,	nations	causes,	ide-
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als….	“[a]ll	faiths	and	all	evaluations	are	equally	non-rational;	all	are	
subjective	direction	given	to	sentiment	and	feeling.	(p.	26)
Nor	does	reason	have	power	to	correct	our	passions,	and	therefore	it	
fails	at	being	a	telos	(MacIntyre,	1984).	With	respect	to	utility,	it	fails	
as	it	simply	cannot	account	for	the	beliefs	in	statements	of	moral	truths	
that	are	founded	in	subjectivity	(MacIntyre,	1984).	For	example,	when	
something	is	a	moral	principle	that	we	must	abide	by,	lack	of	utility	with	
respect	to	enacting	the	principle	does	not	constitute	a	case	of	good	moral	
judgment.	If	something	is	a	moral	principle	(that	supports	a	telos),	then	
one	must	enact	it	regardless	of	reason,	and	utility	may	interfere	with	
upholding	the	principle.	In	the	Golemanian	conception	of	EI,	there	is	
an	equivalent	to	telos	in	his	assertion	that	knowing	one’s	ideal	self	is	an	
important	step	in	the	process	of	developing	emotional	intelligence.	In	
the	next	section,	we	will	take	a	closer	look	at	how	telos	works	in	virtue	
ethics	and,	by	extension,	in	the	cultivation	of	EI.	
A Telos and Unity of Life 
	 An	 important	 feature	 of	 the	 ethical	 life,	 according	 to	MacIntyre	
(1984),	is	that	virtues	are	cultivated	within	the	unity	and	narrative	of	
a	person’s	life.	This	is	in	contrast	to	ethics	in	modernity	that	partitions	
each	human	life	into	work,	leisure,	private	life,	and	public	life—each	
of	which	has	its	own	norms	and	modes	of	behaviour	(MacIntyre,	1984).	
MacIntyre	 (1984)	stated:	“[T]he	unity	of	a	virtue	 in	someone’s	 life	 is	
intelligible	only	as	a	characteristic	of	a	unitary	life,	a	life	that	can	be	
conceived	and	evaluated	as	a	whole”	 (p,	205).	To	the	question	 ‘What	
might	 the	unity	 of	 an	 individual	 life	 consist	 of	 ?’	 he	 responded:	 “Its	
unity	is	the	unity	of	a	narrative	embodied	in	a	single	life.	To	ask	‘What	
is	good	for	me?’	is	to	ask	how	best	might	I	live	out	that	unity	and	bring	
it	to	completion”	(MacIntyre,	1984,	p.	218).	The	response	and	direction	
to	this	arises	out	of	the	development	and	understanding	of	a	telos	for	a	
human	life	that	“transcends	the	limited	goods	of	practices	by	constituting	
the	good	of	a	whole	human	life”	(MacIntyre,	1984,	p.	203).	Further,	this	
telos	is	reinforced	by	the	virtue	of	integrity	or	constancy	that	provides	
a	singleness	of	purpose	throughout	one’s	life.	This	then	gives	some	fur-
ther understanding of the sense of telos that was identified earlier as a 
crucial	component	of	the	science	of	ethics.	
	 What	do	we	have	in	the	Golemanian	EI	that	is	equivalent	or	similar	
to	MacIntyre’s	(1984)	concept	of	telos	and	unity	of	life?	The	closest	thing	
that	we	can	come	up	with	in	reviewing	the	Goleman’s	work	is	the	notion	
of	ideal	self.	Let	us	see	how	this	is	articulated.	Goleman	et	al.	said	the	
key to leadership is emotional resonance that is values-driven, flexible, 
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open	and	honest,	and	connected	to	people	and	networks	(2002).	To	fur-
ther	elaborate	“emotional	resonance,”	McKee	et	al.	(2008)	stated:	
Resonant leaders are attuned to themselves and to the needs, desires 
and	dreams	of	the	people	they	lead.	They	are	energized	by	the	changing	
environment	and	create	conditions	in	which	people	can	be	their	best.	
Such	leaders	seek	a	meaningful	future	for	their	people,	organizations,	
and communities. They are flexible, responsive, and able to establish 
and	maintain	powerful	and	positive	relationships.	(p.	2)
	 The	foundation	of	emotional	resonance	is	self-awareness,	for	which	
Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	proposes	an	approach.	In	addressing	the	question	
of	how	one	becomes	a	more	self-aware	and	resonant	leader,	self-directed	
learning	 is	 an	 essential	 principle.	That	 is,	 the	 individual	must	 take	
responsibility	for	intentionally	developing	one’s	self,	which	usually	re-
quires	becoming	aware	of	her	or	his	emotional	capacities	and	working	
to	change	negative	behavioural	habits	built	up	over	the	decades.	This	is	
difficult work as negative habits are ‘hard-wired’ into the brain. There-
fore,	to	begin	and	sustain	real	development	in	emotional	intelligence,	one	
must	connect	with	one’s	ideal	self.	In	this	process	one	develops	a	good	
understanding	of	his	or	her	dreams,	values,	goals,	emotions,	strengths,	
and	 limitations.	When	 the	 connection	 is	made,	 one	 feels	 passionate	
about	the	possibilities	life	holds,	and	it	is	this	passion	that	carries	one	
through the difficulties inevitably faced in the process of change. Gole-
man	et	al.	(2002)	stated:	“[C]onnecting	with	the	ideal	within	requires	
deep	introspection	at	the	gut	level	to	reveal	the	person	you	would	like	
to	be,	including	what	you	want	in	your	life”	(pp.	115-116).	Finding	one’s	
life	purpose	provides	the	individual	with	the	motivation	to	withstand	
hardships	on	the	way	to	reaching	her	or	his	ideal	self.	What	Goleman	
et	al.	(2002)	are	saying	about	the	ideal	self	and	how	we	work	with	it	
appears	similar	to	MacIntyre’s	(1984)	observation	that	the	cultivation	
of	habits	derived	from	virtue	principles	put	in	order	desires	and	emo-
tions,	which	in	turn	enables	people	to	move	towards	their	telos.	As	we	
mentioned	earlier,	for	MacIntyre	(1984),	such	cultivation	of	habits	takes	
place	within	the	context	of	practices	and	tradition.	It	is	in	the	light	of	
MacIntyre’s	(1984)	articulation	of	these	concepts	that	we	gain	an	un-
derstanding	of	the	shortcomings	of	the	Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	proposals,	
hence	we	shall	consider	them	in	more	detail.	
Centrality of Practice and the Role of Tradition in Virtue Ethics 
 One’s telos or purpose maybe expressed through the specifics of a 
practice	and	it	is	within	a	practice	that	one	acts	virtuously	or	otherwise.	
According	to	MacIntyre	(1984),	a	practice	is	any	“coherent	and	complex	
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form	of	 socially	established	and	cooperative	human	activity	 through	
which	 goods	 internal	 to	 that	 form	 of	 activity	 are	 realized”	 (1984,	 p.	
186).	He	provides	a	wide	range	of	examples	including	football,	chess,	
farming,	 architecture,	 physics,	 raising	 and	 sustaining	 a	 family,	 and	
other	cooperative	activities.	Activities	that	are	not	practices	are	those	
that	develop	technical	skills,	such	as	learning	how	to	throw	a	football	
or	learning	how	to	lay	bricks,	or	practicing	solving	physics	problems.	
These	activities	do	not	meet	all	the	requirements	of	a	practice.	
	 Practices	result	in	the	achievement	of	goods	within	the	context	of	
a	history,	 standards	of	 excellence,	and	obedience	 to	 rules	 set	by	 the	
practice.	Any	practitioner	is	constrained	by	these	conditions	(MacIntyre,	
1984).	According	to	MacIntyre	(1984),	goods	arising	from	a	practice	can	
be	internal	and	external.	External	goods	are	possessions	such	as	power,	
wealth,	and	fame	that	are	achieved	through	competition	wherein	there	
must	be	winners	and	losers.	Although	internal	goods	may	be	the	outcome	
of	competition	to	excel,	their	achievement	is	a	good	for	the	community	
that	participates	in	the	practice.	Virtues	such	as	justice,	courage,	and	
honesty are goods that define our relationships to other people involved 
in	the	practice	(MacIntyre,	1984).	
	 We	believe	that	leadership	in	an	organization,	the	professions,	or	in	
life,	whether	sustaining	a	family,	teaching,	practicing	medicine	or	law,	or	
other such pursuits falls within MacIntyre’s (1984) definition of a practice. 
In	addition,	it	is	our	view	that	the	Golemanian	EI	is	equivalent	to	the	
development	of	internal	goods	because	it	deals	with	the	relationships	
between	people,	and	it	 is	concerned	with	issues	of	values,	trust,	and	
authenticity	(2002).	However,	it	doesn’t	take	into	account	the	priority	
work	environments	place	on	external	goods:	a	concern	articulated	by	
MacIntyre	(1984),	as	we	shall	see	below.	
	 MacIntyre	(1984)	held	that	practices	and	institutions	support	one	
another;	however,	 the	goods	 that	 sustain	practices	are	 internal	 (the	
virtues)	and	the	goods	that	sustain	institutions	are	external	such	as	
reputation,	power,	wealth,	and	so	on.	Therefore,	those	working	within	
institutions are subjected to the corrupting influence of these same 
institutions	(MacIntyre,	1984).	MacIntyre	and	Dunne	(2002)	provided	
an	 example	 in	 educational	 institutions	 whereby	 their	 activities	 are	
measured	in	terms	of	productivity	(how	many	students	graduated	at	
what	cost)	instead	of	a	concern,	for	example,	for	the	cultural	formation	
of	the	student.	What	will	happen,	for	example,	when	individuals	after	
beginning	down	the	road	of	EI	realize	that	their	ideal	selves	and	the	
internal	goods	they	seek	are	not	in	alignment	with	the	values	and	ex-
ternal	goods	sought	by	their	employer?	It	is	likely	that	these	people	will	
either	leave	their	jobs	or	alternatively	experience	a	loss	of	well-being	
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and	a	sense	of	frustration	in	their	jobs.	Econometric	research	conducted	
by	Helliwell	(2005)	in	Europe	and	North	America	on	social	well-being	in	
the	workplace	suggests	that	engagement	with	others	in	the	workplace	
and	community,	work	place	trust,	and	meaningful	work	all	are	very	
important	to	workers.	We	suggest	that	engagement	and	trust	constitute	
aspects	of	goods	internal	to	practice,	and	meaningful	work	suggests	an	
alignment	with	an	individual’s	values	and	ideal	self.	It	is	interesting	
that in Helliwell’s research, these categories ranked significantly higher 
in	importance	than	increasing	income	above	a	moderate	level	(Helliwell,	
2005)—a	category	clearly	linked	to	goods	external	to	practice.	
	 Another	very	important	concept	that	MacIntyre	(1984)	introduced	
is	tradition,	and	we	shall	now	examine	how	it	squares	with	the	Golema-
nian	EI.	As	we	shall	see,	some	tension	arises.	MacIntyre	(1984)	stated	
that	a	living	tradition	provides	a	historical	and	social	context,	an	argu-
ment	and	framework	for	the	good	consistent	within	the	tradition.	The	
individual’s	search	for	his	or	her	good	is	conducted	within	the	context	of	
that	tradition,	and	both	the	individual	and	the	tradition	are	sustained	
by	the	virtues	of	justice,	truthfulness,	courage,	and	intellectual	virtues.	
Cultural	traditions	provide	norms,	priorities,	and	assumptions	about	
what	it	means	to	be	a	person	and	the	expectations	concerning	normal	
behaviour	(Vokey,	2001).	According	to	MacIntyre	(1984):	
The	virtues	therefore	are	to	be	understood	as	those	dispositions	which	
will	not	only	sustain	practices	and	enable	us	to	achieve	the	goods	in-
ternal	to	practices,	but	which	will	also	sustain	us	in	the	relevant	kind	
of	quest	for	the	good,	by	enabling	us	to	overcome	the	harms,	dangers,	
temptations	 and	 distractions	 which	 we	 encounter,	 and	 which	 will	
furnish	us	with	increasing	self-knowledge	and	increasing	knowledge	
of	the	good.	(p.	219)
	 To	this	point,	a	number	of	parallels	between	the	Golemanian	devel-
opment	of	EI	and	MacIntyre’s	(1984)	conception	of	virtue	ethics	have	
been identified; however it is especially on the issue of tradition where 
a significant departure appears. MacIntyre (1988) holds that liberalism 
is	a	tradition	founded	on	concepts	that	are	antithetical	to	the	practice	of	
virtue	ethics.	He	holds	that	individualism	and	personal	preference	are	
fundamental	to	liberalism:	therefore,	there	can	be	no	overriding	good	
except	that	of	the	principle	of	the	individual	and	her	or	his	preferences	
(MacIntyre,	 1988).	 Virtue	 ethics	 views	 the	 individual	 as	 a	 member	
of	a	community,	a	citizen,	who	reasons	and	chooses	within	this	con-
text,	whereas	liberalism	sees	the	individual	as	someone	who	reasons	
and	makes	 choices	within	 the	 context	of	 the	needs	of	 the	 individual	
(MacIntyre,	1988).	In	addition,	liberalism	assumes	that	consumption	
(acquisitiveness)	is	a	cornerstone	of	the	market	economy,	which	takes	
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limitless	economic	growth,	not	internal	goods,	as	a	fundamental	good.	
Conversely,	“Aristotelian	norms	would	not	only	have	to	view	acquisitive-
ness	as	a	vice	but	would	have	to	set	strict	limits	to	growth	insofar	as	that	
is	necessary	to	preserve	or	enhance	a	distribution	of	goods	according	to	
desert”	(MacIntyre,	1988,	p.	112).
	 For	these	reasons	MacIntyre	(1988)	argued	that	the	tradition	of	lib-
eraism	is	not	consistent	with	the	tradition	of	virtue	ethics.	In	addition,	
he	argued	that	liberalism,	by	its	very	nature,	accepts	a	number	of	rival	
and incompatible definitions of the good and accounts of the virtues, and 
therefore	there	can	be	no	shared	program	for	moral	education	within	
public	 institutions	 which	 must	 accommodate	 multiple	 perspectives	
(MacIntyre,	1999).	
	 With	 these	 observations	we	might	 conclude	 by	 saying	 that	 it	 is	
impossible	to	develop	virtue	ethics	in	a	liberal	public	education	insti-
tution,	and	that	EI	itself	is	not	a	form	of	virtue	ethics	as	conceived	by	
MacIntyre	(1984).	That	is,	if	we	take	MacIntyre’s	views	seriously,	then	
we	cannot	be	making	the	case	that	his	virtue	ethics	could	complement	
and	supplement	the	Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	EI	project.	Where	does	this	
situation	leave	us	with	our	own	project	of	fortifying	the	Golemanian	EI	
with	MacIntyre’s	(1984,	1988)	virtue	ethics?	It	is	at	this	point	that	we	
wish	to	turn	to	Vokey	(2001)	for	a	critique	of	MacIntyre’s	(1984,	1988)	
position	and	a	resolution	to	his	concerns,	which	will	give	us	a	way	to	
use	the	basic	insight	gained	from	MacIntyre	about	the	relational	and	
communal	nature	of	the	development	of	virtue	to	fortify	the	Goleman	
et	al.	(2002)	EI	proposal.	
Reasons of the Heart and Intrinsic Value
	 Vokey	(2005)	argued	it	is	important	that	people	learn	to	recognize	what	
a	truly	virtuous	person,	who	acts	based	on	intrinsic	moral	values,	would	
do in particular contexts. He holds that MacIntyre’s (1999, MacIntyre & 
Dunne,	2002)	framework	for	moral	education	does	not	achieve	this	rec-
ognition	because	it	relies	soley	on	a	discursive	and	intellectual	approach	
whereas	intrinsic	value	requires	both	an	intellectual	understanding	and 
an	embodied	emotional	understanding	which	are	known	as	“reasons	of	the	
heart” (Vokey, 2001, pp. 257-309). Intrinsic value is defined as an event 
or	object	judged	to	be	intrinsically	good	for	its	own	sake	as	opposed	to	for	
the	sake	of	human	desires	or	interests	(Vokey,	2005).	
	 Further,	 Vokey	 held	 that	 people	 commonly	 rely	 on	 positive	 and	
negative	aspects	of	their	experiences	to	justify	their	judgments	of	in-
trinsic	value.	This	cognitive-affective	response	is	evident	when	people	
are	“profoundly	moved	in	positive	ways	by	experiencing	or	witnessing	
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freedom,	solidarity	and	compassion;	and	profoundly	moved	in	negative	
ways	by	experiencing	or	witnessing	oppression,	alienation,	and	indiffer-
ence”	(Vokey,	2005,	p.	95).	Moreover,	Vokey	suggested	that	MacIntyre’s	
(1984,	1988)	moral	philosophy	is	limited	in	that	it	emphasizes	discursive,	
propositional	knowledge	at	the	expense	of	practical	personal	knowledge	
(Vokey, 2005) and in that it relies on moral theory grounded in a specific 
faith	to	justify	why	virtues	should	be	intrinsically	valued	(Vokey,	2001).	
Consistent	with	this	view	Vokey	(2001)	holds	that	MacIntyre’s	(1984,	
1988)	philosophy	has	not	considered	the	role	of	non-conceptual	insight	
to	determine	intrinsic	value;	and	with	respect	to	telos,	it	has	relegated	
the	quality	of	human	experience	to	a	motivating	role	as	opposed	to	a	
cognitional	role.	That	is,	MacIntyre’s	(1984)	concept	of	telos	is	grounded	
in	a	tradition	of	faith	(Vokey,	2001);	therefore,	one	would	only	need	to	
know	the	telos	of	one’s	faith	that	provides	the	motivation	to	pursue	a	
virtuous	path.	In	contrast,	Vokey	(2005)	proposed	that	people	commonly	
rely	 on	 human	 experience	 to	 determine	 intrinsic	 value.	 This	 ability	
can	be	developed	in	the	individual	to	provide	a	cognitional	capability	
to	apprehend	one’s	telos	and	the	intrinsic	good.	Our	consideration	of	
Golemanian	 concept	 of	 telos	 revealed	an	 individually	driven	process	
for	 determining	 one’s	 ideal	 self,	 which	may	 or	may	 not	 reference	 a	
particular	faith.	Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	recommended	that	individuals	
engage	in	a	process	of	deep	introspection	at	the	gut	level	to	reveal	their	
personal	ideal,	which,	in	our	view,	coheres	with	Vokey’s	understanding	
of	intrinsic	value.	Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	do	not	articulate	clearly	how	
this	deep	introspection	can	be	done	to	reveal	one’s	personal	ideal.	
	 Vokey	(2005)	addressed	the	limitations	in	MacIntyre’s	(1984,	1988)	
proposals	through	reference	to	Mahayana	Buddhist	traditions,	which	
may	 provide	 some	 clarity	 to	Goleman’s	 et	 al.	 (2002)	 process.	 Vokey	
(2005) proposed that moral education would benefit from an appeal to 
“reasons	of	the	heart”(Vokey	2001,	pp.	257-309)	This	is	achieved	through	
contemplative	practices,	which	he	claimed	create	a	state	of	mind	that	
facilitates	a	personal	direct	awareness	of	intrinsic	value	(Vokey,	2005).	
According	to	this	tradition,	our	usual	awareness	is	dominated	by	concepts,	
discursive	thought	and	dualism	where	subject	and	object	are	perceived	
as	 separate.	Contemplation	 provides	 individuals,	 regardless	 of	 their	
worldviews	and	traditions	with	the	ability	to	increase	their	perception	
of	nondual	and	nondiscursive	states	of	mind	where	they	may	become	
aware	of	 intrinsic	value	 (Vokey,	2005).	To	note,	nondualistic	 experi-
ences	are	not	uncommon	or	esoteric.	They	are	familiar	experiences	of	
musicians,	dancers,	athletes,	and	so	on,	where	there	is	no	separation	
between	action	and	agent	(Vokey,	2005).	Those	with	a	greater	awareness	
of	nonduality	achieve	a	clearer	perception	and	purer	motivation	as	a	
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consequence	of	their	awareness	of	the	unity	of	all	phenomenon	(Vokey,	
2005).	In	practical	terms,	contemplation	enables	a	level	of	perception	
that	provides	a	distance	from	our	emotions	and	the	immediacy	of	our	
dualistic	experience,	and	yet	retains	the	cognitive	content	of	emotions	
to	provide	saliency	in	practical	moral	judgments	(Vokey,	2005).	All	of	
this is not without empirical foundation. Research shows that contem-
plative	practices	support	EI	by	increasing	awareness	of	one’s	internal	
experience, promotion of reflection, self-regulation, and caring for others, 
and	results	in	a	mental	set	that	is	associated	with	effective	classroom	
teaching and facilitation (Jennings & Greenberg, 2009). 
	 In	our	view,	the	above	observations	do	much	to	address	MacIntyre’s	
concern (1999, MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002) that virtue ethics cannot be 
taught	in	a	public	education	setting	since	apprehension	of	intrinsic	good	
through	reasons	of	the	heart	is	available	to	anyone,	regardless	of	tradi-
tions	 and	worldviews,	 and	 can	 be	 augmented	 through	 contemplative	
practices.	In	addition,	they	appear	to	provide	a	more	structured	approach	
to	the	EI	concept	of	developing	one’s	life	purpose.	Vokey’s	(2001)	proposal	
may	also	help	to	shift	the	emphasis	away	from	being	solely	motivated	by	
one’s	purpose	to	a	motivation	generated	by	the	intrinsic	value	of	being	
virtuous.	His	proposal	is	based	on	an	articulation	of	MacIntyre’s	concern	
(1984)	regarding	the	modern	manager	(and	by	extension,	the	educators)	
being	an	emotivist,	and	not	being	able	to	participate	in	the	virtues	she	or	
he	derives	for	the	modern	world.	MacIntyre	(1984)	held	that	they	operate	
in	the	mode	of	emotivism	because	their	moral	judgments	are	based	on	
the	non-rational,	subjective	attitudes	and	feelings	of	the	individual.	That	
is,	there	are	no	standards	or	criteria	against	which	moral	judgments	are	
made	(MacIntyre,	1984).	He	also	held	that	emotivism	removes	the	distinc-
tion	between	manipulative	and	non-manipulative	social	relations:	a	valid	
and	serious	concern	with	respect	to	any	application	of	the	Goleman	et	
al. (2002) EI thesis. Influences that the leader’s emotions have on others 
work	just	as	ethically	as	unethically.
	 On	 this	matter,	MacIntyre	 (1984)	 held	 that	 humans	who	 are	 in	
relationships	uninformed	by	morality	treat	the	other	as	a	means	to	his	
or	her	ends	wherein	the	other	is	seen	as	an	instrument.	Those	in	power	
may apply whatever influences are necessary to achieve through that 
person.	On	 the	 other	hand,	a	person	guided	by	morality	 of	 intrinsic	
valuing treats the other as an end. For example, in a leader/subordinate 
relationship,	the	leader,	rather	than	coercion	or	manipulation	through	
his	or	her	position	of	authority,	might	offer	subordinates	good	reasons	for	
acting	one	way	or	another,	and	leave	it	to	her	or	him	to	evaluate	those	
reasons	and	act	accordingly	(MacIntyre,	1984).	In	this	way	the	values,	
opinions,	and	contribution	of	subordinates	are	intrinsically	valued.	
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	 We	are	indeed	concerned	that	introducing	the	Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	
concept	of	EI	to	teaching	may	formalize	emotivism,	just	as	MacIntyre	
(1984)	warned	us	about	subjectivity	and	the	lack	of	criterion.	However,	
we	believe	that	this	can	be	addressed	by	reinforcing	the	understanding	
Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	has	noted—that	a	leader’s,	or	educator’s	feelings	
are	not	private;	they	have	public	consequences.	Awareness	of	this	pro-
vides	a	criterion	of	transparency,	authenticity,	and	honesty	that	can	
be	called	upon	when	we	work	with	people	to	cultivate	their	ethics	and	
emotional	intelligence.	To	some	extent	it	imposes	an	internal-external	
measure	on	 the	 educator	 to	be	honest	with	him	or	herself	 and	with	
others.	For	example,	if	I	as	a	teacher,	am	consistently	disinterested	in	
teaching	or	do	not	have	the	best	interests	of	my	students	at	heart,	this	
internal	state	of	mind	will	be	felt	by	the	students	and	my	effectiveness	
as	a	teacher	will	be	compromised.	Ethical	teaching	then	becomes	not	
just	a	matter	of	technique	but	of	state	of	mind	of	the	teacher.	Further,	
addressing	MacIntyre’s	 concerns	 (1984),	 once	 individuals	 realize	 the	
nature	of	the	open	relationship	they	have	with	others,	they	are	likely	
to	see	students	and	followers	intrinsically	rather	than	instrumentally	
and	understand	that	they	are	making	moral	decisions.	We	believe	that	
the	contemplative	exercises	advocated	by	Vokey	(2001)	will	strengthen	
and	support	this	important	understanding.	The	resulting	congruence	of	
educators’	values	and	the	nature	of	their	relationships	with	themselves	
and	others	cannot	be	hidden,	and	will	constitute	as	the	positive	force	in	
emotional	contagion.
	 We	believe	that	personal	experience	and	knowledge	of	the	need	
for	intrinsic	valuing	of	others	is	a	foundation	of	ethics	but	it	does	not	
replace	the	need	for	practice	and	an	intellectual	understanding	of	vir-
tue	ethics.	We	would	need	to	impose	on	ourselves	engaged	in	the	task	
of	increasing	EI	the	ethical	norms	that	we	normally	think	of	as	part	
of	the	tradition	of	virtue	ethics	such	as	compassion,	courage,	honesty,	
and	wisdom	and	include	an	examination	of	our	values	and	life	purpose	
in	light	of	these	norms.	In	addition,	given	our	plural	society,	we	would	
want	to	develop	a	broad	knowledge	of	other	ethical	systems	such	as	
deontology,	 	utility	ethics,	and	the	ethics	of	dominant	religions.	We	
believe	 that	 adding	 the	 extra	 dimension	 of	 ethical	 considerations,	
based	on	MacIntyre’s	work	(1984,	1988),	to	the	Golemanian	EI	project	
would	address	MacIntyre’s	concern	that	leaders	make	moral	decisions	
solely	on	subjective	feelings	and	attitudes	and	are	not	subject	to	ex-
ternal	criteria.	Hence,	the	development	of	EI	has	the	potential	to	be	
a moral practice. This could result in a significant shift in thinking. 
Yet	the	present	reality	has	not	made	this	shift.	MacIntyre	(1984)	is	
right	in	observing	that,	for	much	of	the	twentieth	century,	managers	
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and	educators	viewed	those	under	them	instrumentally.	He	consid-
ered	educators	and	managers	 to	 fall	 into	a	 character	 category	 that	
exemplifies the fundamental values of an era (1984): for our era, it is 
instrumentalism.	For	example,	a	contemporary	educator	may	typically	
be	concerned	with	the	well-being	of	students	only	in	as	much	as	their	
grades and success provide a good reflection on him or her. 
	 Based	on	our	comparison	of	Golemanian	EI	to	MacIntyre’s	(1984,	
1988)	virtue	ethics	we	have	three	considerations	that	militate	against	
implementing	virtue	ethics	and	EI	in	contemporary	educational	envi-
ronments:	(a)	traditional	management	practices	that	see	those	under	
them	as	instruments;	(b)	our	culture	that	values	external	goods	over	
internal	goods;	(c)	and	the	institutions	themselves	that	can	only	seek	
external goods. In these environments, it is not difficult to imagine 
that	the	concept	of	EI	itself	will	be	instrumentally	utilized	as	a	means	
to	achieve	higher	output,	yet	its	underlying	principle	appears	to	lead	
in	a	broader	direction	whereby	the	well-being	of	those	working	in	an	
institution	are	its	primary	concern,	and	the	achievement	of	better	per-
formance	is	secondary.	The	difference	between	applying	EI	to	obtain	
improved	productivity	over	the	objective	of	assisting	employees	achieve	
well being has significant implications particularly in the context of 
a	culture	and	organizations	that	are	instrumentally	driven.	Perhaps	
this	tension	can	be	resolved	through	the	Goleman’s	observation	that	
the	self-management	of	EI	“enables	transparency,	which	is	not	only	a	
virtue	but	also	an	organizational	strength.	Transparency—an	authentic	
openness	 to	 others	 about	 one’s	 feelings,	 beliefs,	 and	 actions—allows	
integrity,	or	the	sense	that	one	can	be	trusted”	(Goleman	et	al.,	2002,	p.	
47).	This	attribute	relies	on	impulse	control,	and	allows	one	to	live	his	
or	her	values.	As	well,	it	means	one	is	comfortable	with	the	questions	
transparency pose (Goleman et al., 2002). We also identified means of 
augmenting	and	generalizing	MacIntyre’s	(1984,	1988)	virtue	ethics	by	
recommending	the	introduction	of	contemplative	disciplines	as	a	means	
of	balancing	the	intellectual	emphasis	with	reference	to	the	quality	of	
human	experience.	
Implications for Education
	 At	the	beginning	of	this	article	we	suggested	that	how	a	teacher	feels	
is	not	a	private	matter:	rather,	it	has	public	consequences	that	impacts	
students’	performance,	and	the	learning	environment	might	be	shaped	
as	much	or	more	by	resonance	of	the	educator’s	feelings	and	emotions	
than	their	words	and	actions.	Given	this,	we	suggested	that	educators	
have	a	responsibility	as	part	of	their	training	and	life	long	learning	to	
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develop	their	EI.	Further,	with	the	exception	of	concerns	regarding	the	
role	of	a	tradition,	we	have	argued	that	the	development	of	EI	should	be	
a moral practice as defined by MacIntyre (1984). Thus, those develop-
ing	 their	EI	may	be	 implicitly	 learning	virtue	ethics.	With	 respect	 to	
education	in	the	virtues,	MacIntyre	held	that	the	fully	virtuous	person	
acts	on	the	basis	of	knowledge	of	the	good	(Vokey,	2001)	and	that	both	
intellectual	virtues	and	virtues	of	character	are	required	to	achieve	this	
end.	Intellectual	virtues	are	acquired	through	teaching	and	the	virtues	
of	character	through	habitual	exercise	(MacIntyre,	1984).	MacIntyre	(as	
cited	in	Vokey,	2001)	held	that	these	forms	of	moral	education	cannot	be	
separated	because	“character	building	requires	both	the	practice	of	virtuous	
acts	and	intellectual	knowledge”	(pp.	159-160).	As	we	have	seen	earlier,	
MacIntyre	(1984)	held	that	virtue	ethics	is	developed	within	the	context	
of	one’s	life	purpose,	and	exercised	over	one’s	life	and	within	the	context	
of	a	community	and	a	tradition.	In	terms	of	developing	one’s	EI,	Gole-
man	et	al.	(2002)	held	that	it	is	developed	within	the	context	of	one’s	life	
purpose,	requires	knowledge	and	practice,	and	is	best	conducted	with	the	
benefit of a positive supportive community that help people make positive 
changes, particularly if the relationships are filled with candour, trust, 
and	psychological	safety”	(p.	163).	It	is	noteworthy	that	these	communi-
ties	appear	to	be	formed	outside	the	formal	structure	of	the	work	place,	
perhaps	because	many	work	places	do	not	provide	the	required	sense	of	
psychological	safety	and	personal	and	existential	engagement.	
	 Both	MacIntyre	 (1984)	 and	Goleman	 et	 al.	 (2002)	 contemplated	
providing	a	context	within	which	 their	 respective	concepts	are	 to	be	
developed.	MacIntyre,	(1984)	however,	proposed	a	much	more	rigorous	
context	in	the	form	of	a	philosophical	argument	and	cultural	tradition	
than	Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	who	proposed	ad	hoc	support	groups.	We	
agree	with	MacIntyre	(1984)	that	current	cultural	and	institutional	norms	
make the development of virtue ethics in our society difficult; however 
we	believe	that	this	concern	may	be	addressed	through	the	provision	of	
formal	support	for	those	developing	EI	and	virtue	ethics.	Therefore,	we	
recommend,	for	instance	with	respect	to	teacher	education,	virtue	ethics	
to	be	explicitly	incorporated	with	the	concept	of	EI,	and	that	teacher	
education	as	an	institution	should	house	a	community	dedicated	to	sup-
port those developing virtues, or goods internal to practices which define 
relationships	to	students,	teachers,	and	administrators.	Based	on	the	
arguments	presented	in	this	paper,	we	offer	the	following	guidelines	to	
learning	communities	interested	in	implementing	EI	integrated	with	
virtue	ethics:	
• Clearly define its purpose consistent with virtue ethics;
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•	 Be	led	by	a	leader	with	strong	EI	and	exemplary	ethics;	
•	 Provide	support	for	development	of	one’s	life	purpose;
•	 Provide	training	and	a	space	for	contemplative	practices;
•	 Include	teaching	of	theory	and	practice	of	ethics;	
•	 Include	teaching	the	theory	and	practice	of	developing	one’s	
EI	or	one	of	its	derivatives	as	part	of	its	program;	
•	 Provide	life-long	support	for	teachers	through	programs	as	
they	encounter	ethical	and	emotional	issues	in	the	workplace.
 In sum, virtue ethics and EI appear to bear significant similarities. 
Given this, we argue that the project of cultivating EI will benefit from 
an	explicit	recognition	that	it	is	indeed	virtue	ethics.	As	an	implication	
for	teacher	education,	we	propose	the	need	for	an	appropriately	struc-
tured	community	to	support	teachers	in	developing	ethics	and	emotional	
competencies.	We	have	provided	broad	recommendations	on	what	this	
might look like, but much needs to be done to fill in the details. 
Notes
	 1 CASEL gathers scientific evidence to demonstrate the contributions of social 
and	emotional	learning	to	students’	academic	and	social	success	and	provides	
practitioners	and	school	administrators	with	the	resources	to	improve	and	expand	
social	emotional	learning.	For	example,	recent	research	sponsored	by	CASEL	ex-
amined	the	impact	of	social	emotional	learning	(SEL)	programs	on	K-8	students	in	
the	US.	This	work	examined	317	studies	involving	324,303	students	and	observed	
improvement	in	student’s	social-emotional	skills,	attitudes	about	self	and	others,	
connection	to	school,	positive	social	behavior,	and	academic	performance	(Payton	
et	al.,	2008).	CASEL	argues	that	teachers’	social	and	emotional	competence	(SEC)	
contributes	to	creating	a	climate	conducive	to	 learning	and	promotes	positive	
development	outcomes	among	students	and	proposes	that	programs	be	created	
to develop teachers’ SEC (Jennings & Greenberg, 2009).
	 2	Cohen	(2006),	Director	of	CASEL	draws	a	close	association	between	SEL	
and	ethical	development.
	 3	One	of	the	ethical	frameworks	that	we	have	considered	for	our	project	of	
fortifying	Goleman’s	(2002)	EI	theory	with	an	ethical	theory	is	ethics	of	care	as	
developed	by	Noddings	(Noddings,	2002;	Noddings,	2006;	Noddings,	2006;	Nod-
dings,	2010)),	a	prominent	theorist	and	proponent	of	ethics	of	care	(from	here	
on,	EC).	Our	pragmatic	decision,	however,	is	not	to	utilize	this	theory,	despite	
the	fact	that	ethics	of	care	has	some	similarities	to	EI.	For	example,	EC	does	
accord	priority	to	emotion	over	reason,	and	also	emphasizes	the	relational	aspect	
of	learning	to	be	moral.	However,	we	found	that	MacIntyre’s	(1984)	Aristotelian	
based	virtue	ethics	to	be	far	more	congruent	with	EI,	and,	as	this	paper	will	
show,	to	have	the	right	features	that	we	are	looking	for	with	which	to	modify	and	
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augment	EI.	These	features	mostly	have	to	do	with	rigorous	and	even	painstak-
ing	cultivation	of	individual	moral	agency	that	virtue	ethics	articulates.	EC,	in	
contrast,	is	not	focused	on	such	cultivation	as	it	sees	care	as	innate	and	emergent	
from	human	sociality,	and	just	needs	to	be	extended	appropriately	for	it	to	be	a	
moral	force.	Not	incidentally,	Noddings	denies	that	care	is	a	virtue	(Halwani,	
2003).	Virtue	ethics,	however,	relies	on	individuals	striving	for	their	personal	
ideal	and	an	understanding	of	the	nature	of	consciousness.	These	differences	
inform	a	different	emphasis	and	approach	to	moral	education—a	topic	eminently	
worth	exploring	but	not	within	this	paper	with	its	particular	objective.	
	 4	“From	a	moral	perspective,	EI	lacks	moral	depth	and	does	not	exclude	
the	 possibility	 that	 a	 calculated	 Machiavellian	 personality	 can	 be	 deemed	
emotionally	intelligent.	From	an	educational	perspective,	the	paucity	of	solid	
empirical research on the efficiency of SEL programs adds further doubts to the 
psychological	and	moral	ones	about	the	viability	of	EI	training	in	the	classroom”	
(Kristjánsson,	2006,	p.55)	The	validity	of	the	construct	was	further	criticized	by	
Waterhouse	who	supports	Kristjánsson’s	observations	regarding	its	inadequa-
cies	in	promoting	moral	development	and	further	states	that	“emotional	intel-
ligence	theories	have	inadequate	empirical	support	and	are	not	consistent	with	
cognitive neuroscience findings” and should not be applied in education (2006 
p.247).	In	response	empirical	research	is	cited	to	refute	the	neuroscience	and	
moral criticisms (Cherniss, Extein, Goleman, & Weissberg, 2006), however we 
believe	that	philosophic	concerns	regarding	the	lack	of	moral	depth	of	EI	were	
not specifically or adequately addressed in this paper. 
	 5	Feminists	have	been	rightly	pointing	out	that	the	classic	western	philosophi-
cal	traditions’	separation	of	intellect	and	emotion,	and	devaluation	of	the	latter,	is	
concomitant	with	devaluation	of	the	female	gender	(Martin	1981,	Noddings	2002).	
We	the	authors	of	this	paper	agree.	We	also	agree	that	there	may	be	manifest	
gender	differences	(whether	socially	constructed	or	biologically	based)	in	terms	
of	all	manners	of	social	practices,	including	how	we	participate	in	the	world	and	
care	for	things	and	beings.	Ethics	of	care	centralizes	gender	difference,	and	is	
committed	to	honouring	the	feminine	way	of	being	moral—caring.	Coming	from	
our	Asian	philosophical	perspective,	however,	we	do	not	see	care	as	a	gendered	
capacity.	Nor	do	we	see	the	feminine	as	essentially	belonging	to	females.	‘Femi-
nine’	and	‘masculine’	are	archetypal	psychological	principles	that	both	males	and	
females	embody	and	need	to	work	with	in	cultivating	moral	agency.	
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